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I. INTRODUCTION
From its relative obscurity over the past three decades,1 Ebola viral
disease (“EVD”) emerged as a substantial global biothreat in 2014
and 2015.  The current outbreak of varied strains of Ebola, beginning
in March 2014 in Guinea, is projected to impact hundreds of
thousands of people2 over months,3 years, or even indefinitely.4  As of
October 31, 2014, the spread of EVD was concentrated in several Af-
rican countries (e.g., Sierra Leone, Liberia, Guinea, and an unrelated
outbreak in Democratic Republic of Congo),5 with limited additional
cases in Nigeria, Senegal, and Mali.  Over 2,700 people are known to
have died from Ebola in fewer than eight months in Liberia alone; the
actual death toll may be far higher.6  At one point, the U.S. Centers
for Disease Control and Prevention (“CDC”) estimated a worst-case
scenario of 1.4 million new cases arising largely in already affected
countries by early 2015.7  Reported cases in the affected regions are
considerably less than these estimates, but  with a fatality rate hover-
1. Outbreaks Chronology: Ebola Virus Disease, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CON-
TROL & PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/resources/outbreak-table.html
#one (last updated Feb. 5, 2015).
2. Nick Cumming-Bruce & Alan Cowell, Ebola Could Strike 20,000, World
Health Agency Says, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 28, 2014, at A7, available at http://www.nytimes
.com/2014/08/29/world/africa/ebola-outbreak.html; Sarah Larimer, 20,000 Cases or
100,000? How Researchers Predict Ebola’s Spread, WASH. POST (Sept. 8, 2014), http://
www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-health/wp/2014/09/08/20000-cases-or-100000-
how-researchers-predict-ebolas-spread/.
3. Jon Harper, Dempsey: Ebola Mission Will Probably Last 18 Months, STARS &
STRIPES (Nov. 6, 2014), http://www.stripes.com/news/dempsey-ebola-mission-will-
probably-last-18-months-1.312528.
4. Denise Grady, U.S. Scientists See Long Fight Against Ebola, N.Y. TIMES, Sept.
12, 2014, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/13/world/africa/us-scien-
tists-see-long-fight-against-ebola.html?_r=1&referrer=.
5. 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/previous-up-
dates.html (last updated Feb. 6, 2014) [hereinafter U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, 2014 Ebola Outbreak in West Africa].
6. EBOLA RESPONSE ROADMAP SITUATION REPORT UPDATE, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. 2 tbl.1 (2014), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/137592/1/roadmapsitrep_7
Nov2014_eng.pdf?ua=1.
7. Questions and Answers: Estimating the Future Number of Cases in the Ebola
Epidemic—Liberia and Sierra Leone, 2014–2015, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
& PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/outbreaks/2014-west-africa/qa-mmwr-
estimating-future-cases.html (last updated Nov. 19, 2014).
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ing near 50%,8 thousands more West Africans may perish before the
end of this current outbreak.9
Countering these dire threats are multiple international and re-
gional response efforts fueled by hundreds of millions of relief dollars.
Critically-needed supplies are being funneled to West Africa.
Thousands of health care workers (“HCWs”) from the United States,
Europe, China, and Cuba, among other countries, are responding de-
spite significant risks to their own health and safety.10  Rapid develop-
ment and testing of vaccines and treatments are underway.  In the
interim, an array of existing experimental medications is currently be-
ing used or considered on a limited basis.11  These interventions may
help lower human morbidity and mortality rates related to EVD so
long as they are well-timed, efficacious, and ethically allocated.
Yet waiting for a medical panacea or vaccine that may be months or
years in the making is not an option when hundreds of people are
dying each  week throughout West Africa.12  Immediate public health
responses include declarations of emergencies at the international, na-
tional, and regional levels.  On August 8, 2014, the World Health Or-
ganization (“WHO”) declared a public health emergency of
international concern.13  Several West African nations have also de-
clared formal states of emergency.14  Other countries or regions at risk
for outbreaks may follow suit.15
8. WORLD HEALTH ORG., Ebola Virus Disease, West Africa—Update, UN
GLOBAL EBOLA RESPONSE (Aug. 28, 2014), http://www.afro.who.int/en/clusters-a-
programmes/dpc/epidemic-a-pandemic-alert-and-response/outbreak-news/4264-ebola
-virus-disease-west-africa-28-august-2014.html [hereinafter WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
Ebola Virus Disease, West Africa].
9. Marcelo F.C. Gomes et al., Assessing the International Spreading Risk Associ-
ated with the 2014 West African Ebola Outbreak, PLOS CURRENTS: OUTBREAKS
(Sept. 2, 2014), http://currents.plos.org/outbreaks/article/assessing-the-international-
spreading-risk-associated-with-the-2014-west-african-ebola-outbreak/.
10. WORLD HEALTH ORG., Ebola Virus Disease, West Africa, supra note 8, at 6.
11. HHS Advances Development of Ebola Vaccine, U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH &
HUMAN SERVS. (Oct. 16, 2014), http://www.hhs.gov/news/press/2014pres/10/201410
16a.html.
12. Rick Gladstone, W.H.O. Assails Delay in Ebola Vaccine, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 3,




13. Statement on the 1st Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee on the 2014
Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Aug. 8, 2014), http://
www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-20140808/en/.
14. James G. Hodge, Jr., Emergency Legal Preparedness Concerning Ebola: A Pri-
mer, NETWORK FOR PUB. HEALTH L. 8, https://www.networkforphl.org/_asset/dzf8u4/
Ebola-Outbreak-2014---Network-Overview.pdf (last updated Dec. 1, 2014).
15. Abby Phillip, Oxford Study Predicts 15 More Countries Are at Risk of Ebola
Exposure, WASH. POST (Sept. 9, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/news/to-your-
health/wp/2014/09/09/oxford-study-predicts-15-more-countries-are-at-risk-of-ebola-
exposure/.
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Emergency declarations16 authorize a profound array of public
health measures that create layers of containment designed to curtail
infection.  Social distancing powers include closures, curfews, isola-
tion, quarantine, travel restrictions, and even lockdowns.17  Some of
these measures are known to limit the spread of infectious disease.
Others are wielded despite little or no proof of their efficacy.  In some
instances, implementation of these public health emergency powers
may even exacerbate the spread of Ebola and lead to other negative
health impacts.
Imposing ill-advised, non-efficacious governmental powers in the
guise of disease control (1) skews Ebola modeling estimates from
WHO, CDC, and others who assume that rates of transmission may
diminish as social distancing measures take hold; (2) significantly in-
fringes on civil and human rights, driving epidemics underground; and
(3) increases human death tolls from Ebola and other unrelated con-
ditions for which persons may lack access to treatment.  Each of these
results is untenable.
Clear scientific guidance is needed on the efficacy of legal interven-
tions to protect the public’s health during emergencies.  Meeting this
objective is challenging given the multifarious public health impacts
extending from EVD.  As documented in Part II, these impacts ex-
tend well beyond those suffering from the disease.  EVD threatens the
health, lives, economy, and security of millions of people in different
ways.  Public health measures addressing EVD may carry broader,
negative public health ramifications.  The legal authorities to carry out
these public health measures pursuant to emergency declarations are
discussed in Part III (and illustrated in Appendix 1).  Several West
African countries have used multiple public health interventions in an
attempt to control Ebola amidst objections and international criticism.
Part IV looks closely at the human rights implications of specific
social distancing powers.  Potential or actual breaches of human rights
to life, health, and access to food, housing, and medical treatments,
among other infringements, question the lawfulness of emergency
powers that also lack proven efficacy.  Building on this theme, Part V
explores how use of public health powers in real-time emergencies
may negate or derail broader public health outcomes.  Three case
studies of social distancing powers—isolation, border closure, and
lockdown—are presented.  The viability and legality of these and
other public health measures in response to Ebola are elucidated, fol-
lowed by a brief conclusion.
16. See, e.g., Gregory Korte, Special Report: America’s Perpetual State of Emer-
gency, USA TODAY (Oct. 23, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/politics/
2014/10/22/president-obama-states-of-emergency/16851775/.
17. JAMES G. HODGE, JR., PUBLIC HEALTH LAW IN A NUTSHELL 93 (2013).
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II. GLOBAL AND DOMESTIC HEALTH IMPACTS OF EBOLA
EVD has infected over 22,000 individuals, a majority of whom are
women, and has claimed almost 9,000 lives in West Africa (as of Feb-
ruary 11, 2015).18  CDC Director Tom Frieden likened the health
threat from the current outbreak to that caused by HIV/AIDS, which
has killed more than 36 million people worldwide since its emergence
in the 1980s.19  While prior Ebola outbreaks were concentrated largely
in rural areas, the disease has made its way in 2014 to impoverished
urban areas of West Africa.20  Its rapid spread is owed to a “combina-
tion of dysfunctional health systems, international indifference, high
population mobility, local customs, densely populated capitals, and
lack of trust in authorities after years of armed conflict.”21  EVD has
necessitated new approaches involving community training on proper
handling of dead bodies to prevent further infection.22
HCWs struggle to meet Ebola patients’ needs.23  Several West Afri-
can hospitals closed due to a lack of available HCWs to staff them.  In
Bong County, Liberia, the closure of Phebe Hospital left 330,000 with-
out any emergency hospital facilities.24  WHO, CDC, U.S. Depart-
ment of Defense, Doctors Without Borders, and multiple other
entities are attempting to recruit and train hundreds of new HCWs on
proper techniques for treating patients while protecting worker
18. Ebola Situation Report 11 February 2015, WORLD HEALTH ORG.  (Feb. 11,
2015), http://apps.who.int/ebola/en/ebola-situation-report/situation-reports/ebola-situ-
ation-report-11-february-2015; Heather Saul, Ebola Crisis: This Is Why ‘75%’ of Vic-
tims Are Women, INDEPENDENT (Aug. 20, 2014), http://www.independent.co.uk/news/
world/africa/ebola-virus-outbreak-this-is-why-75-of-victims-are-women-9681442.html.
19. Elizabeth Chuck, CDC Director on Ebola: ‘The Only Thing Like This Has
Been AIDS, NBC News (Oct. 9, 2014, 10:29 AM), http://www.nbcnews.com/storyline/
ebola-virus-outbreak/cdc-director-ebola-only-thing-has-been-aids-n222106.
20. David L. Heymann, Commentary, Ebola: Learn from the Past, 514 NATURE
299, 299 (2014), available at http://www.nature.com/polopoly_fs/1.16117!/menu/main/
topColumns/topLeftColumn/pdf/514299a.pdf.
21. Jeremy J. Farrar & Peter Piot, The Ebola Emergency—Immediate Action,
Ongoing Strategy, 371 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1545, 1545 (2014), available at http://
www.nejm.org/doi/pdf/10.1056/NEJMe1411471.
22. Sam Smith, Fighting Ebola: “I’ve Never Experienced Anything Like This,”
BRIT. RED CROSS (Oct. 24, 2014), http://blogs.redcross.org.uk/emergencies/2014/10/
fighting-ebola-ive-never-experienced-anything-like/; Tristan McConnell, Some People
Would Rather Die of Ebola Than Stop Hugging Sick Loved Ones, GLOBAL POST (Oct.
10, 2014, 4:22 PM), http://www.globalpost.com/dispatch/news/health/141010/familes-
cant-mourn-ebola-victims-liberia (Liberia’s central facility cremated 30 to 40 bodies a
day in October, down from more than 80 bodies a day in September.  Still, many
individuals remain at risk of infection through handling of the dead.).
23. Betsy McKay & Drew Hinshaw, Lack of Qualified Staff Hurts Ebola Fight in
Africa, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 2, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/lack-of-qualified-
staff-hurts-ebola-fight-in-africa-1412293011.
24. Colin Freeman, One Patient in a 200-Bed Hospital: How Ebola Has Devastated
Liberia’s Health System, TELEGRAPH (Aug. 15, 2014, 6:00 PM), http://www.tele-
graph.co.uk/news/worldnews/ebola/11037365/One-patient-in-a-200-bed-hospital-how-
Ebola-has-devastated-Liberias-health-system.html.
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safety.25  Not only is there a lack of trained HCWs, but also personal
protective equipment (“PPE”), basic medical supplies, and sanitary
water are in short supply.26
With limited resources and personnel devoted to EVD responses,
additional health threats from cases of malaria, typhoid, and HIV may
rise at an alarming rate.  In 2012, malaria led to 1,700 deaths in Liberia
and an estimated 627,000 deaths worldwide.27  Typhoid and paraty-
phoid fevers killed more than 14,000 in Western Sub-Saharan Africa
and 190,242 globally in 2010.28  Approximately 68% of all new HIV
cases are reported in Sub-Saharan Africa.29  The Ebola outbreak has
brought many control efforts for these and other diseases (e.g., mea-
sles)30 in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea to a standstill.31  Spikes in
the infection rates of these conditions in the aftermath of Ebola may
constitute the next public health crisis in these regions.
Children arguably suffer most during outbreaks.32  Routine vaccina-
tion programs have been completely halted or severely reduced, lead-
ing to potential deaths from vaccine-preventable diseases.33  While
infant mortality rates in Liberia, Sierra Leone, and Guinea have de-
clined in recent years,34 pregnant women lack access to medical cen-
25. McKay & Hinshaw, supra note 23.
26. Sarah Boseley, Ebola Crisis—The Guardian Briefing, GUARDIAN (Oct. 31,
2014), http://www.theguardian.com/world/2014/sep/25/-sp-ebola-crisis-briefing; Josh
Harris, Shortage of Engineers and Sanitation Experts Risk Undermining Efforts to
Halt Ebola Virus in West Africa, Warns International Medical Corp., INT’L MED.
CORPS UK (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.internationalmedicalcorps.org.uk/shortage-engi-
neers-sanitation-experts-risks-undermining-efforts-halt-ebola-virus-outbreak-west-
africa-warns-international-medical-corps/.
27. WORLD MALARIA REPORT, WORLD HEALTH ORG. ix. 149 (2013), http://
www.who.int/malaria/publications/world_malaria_report_2013/report/en/.
28. GBD Data, Typhoid in Western Sub-Saharan Africa & Globally, INST. FOR
HEALTH METRICS & EVALUATION (2014), http://www.healthdata.org/search-gbd-
data?s=typhoid%20Western%20Sub-Saharan%20Africa.
29. The Global HIV/AIDS Epidemic, KAISER FAMILY FOUND. (Dec. 1, 2014),
http://kff.org/global-health-policy/fact-sheet/the-global-hivaids-epidemic. See also Li-
beria, HIV and AIDS Estimates, UNAIDS (2013), http://www.unaids.org/en/region-
scountries/countries/liberia.
30. Guidance for Immunization Programmes in the African Region in the Context
of Ebola, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 24, 2014), http://www.measlesrubellainitia-
tive.org/wp-content/uploads/2014/10/Immunization_and_Ebola_Version
_Oct_24_2014.pdf [hereinafter Guidance].
31. Ericka Check Hayden, Ebola Obstructs Malaria-Control, 514 NATURE 15, 15,
available at http://www.nature.com/polopoly_fs/1.16029!/menu/main/topColumns/top
LeftColumn/pdf/514015a.pdf.
32. Sheri Fink, Ebola’s Mystery: One Boy Lives, Another Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Nov.
10, 2014, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/10/world/africa/the-capri
cious-hand-of-ebola-one-boy-survives-as-others-die.html?action=click&content
Collection=health&region=footer&module=moreInSection&pgtype=article&_r=0.
33. Lisa Schlein, Ebola Has Devastating Impact on Children in Liberia, VOICE OF
AMERICA (Sept. 12, 2014, 11:18 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/ebola-has-
devastating-impact-on-children-in-liberia/2448520.html; Guidance, supra note 30.
34. At a Glance: Liberia, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/liberia
_2513.html (last updated May 25, 2012); At a Glance: Sierra Leone, UNICEF, http://
2015] EMERGENCY LEGAL PREPAREDNESS 359
ters to deliver their babies due to closures or unavailability of space.35
In the weeks ahead, this lack of access may increase infant mortality
rates.36  Young children are also orphaned at a distressing rate due to
Ebola deaths among their parents or caregivers.37
Collateral impacts of Ebola in West Africa are equally significant.
Agricultural production, tourism, mining, and service industries are all
diminished in the affected regions.38  Border closures have halted
commercial activities39 and limited food supplies.40  Food prices have
increased an average of 24% in Liberia, Guinea, and Sierra Leone,
making available food unattainable for many.41  Markets emptied as
government restrictions and fears of infection led people to avoid con-
gregating.42  Labor shortages rose as workers became ill or took care
of ill relatives.43  Deaths among farmers may leave fields fallow and
threaten immediate food supplies.44  An estimated 750,000 West Afri-
www.unicef.org/infobycountry/sierraleone_statistics.html (last updated Dec. 27, 2013);
At a Glance: Guinea, UNICEF, http://www.unicef.org/infobycountry/guinea_statis-
tics.html (last updated Dec. 26, 2013).
35. Ebola Effect Reverses Gains in Maternal, Child Mortality, INTEGRATED REG’L
INFO. NETWORKS (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.irinnews.org/report/100698/ebola-effect-
reverses-gains-in-maternal-child-mortality.
36. See id.
37. Debora Patta, Ebola Orphans of Liberia, CBS NEWS (Oct. 20, 2014, 7:15 PM),
http://www.cbsnews.com/news/finding-hope-after-being-orphaned-by-ebola; Adam
Balles, Ebola Orphanage Opens in Sierra Leone, VOICE OF AMERICA (Oct. 20, 2014,
1:50 PM), http://www.voanews.com/content/ebola-orphanage-opens-in-sierra-leone/
2489944.html.
38. Amadou Sy & Amy Copley, Understanding the Economic Effects of 2014
Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, BROOKINGS (Oct. 1, 2014, 3:41 PM), http://
www.brookings.edu/blogs/africa-in-focus/posts/2014/10/01-ebola-outbreak-west-africa
-sy-copley; The Cost of a Pandemic Ebola’s Economic Impact, ECONOMIST (Sept. 3,
2014, 7:19 PM), http://www.economist.com/blogs/baobab/2014/09/costs-pandemic.
39. Marcelo Giugale, The Economic Impact of Ebola, WORLD POST (Oct. 8, 2014,
9:00 AM), http://www.huffingtonpost.com/marcelo-giugale/the-economic-impact-of-
eb_b_5951458.html.
40. Unprecedented Modern Famine to Follow Ebola Outbreak, CNBC AFR. (Oct.
22, 2014, 7:17 PM), http://www.cnbcafrica.com/video/?bctid=3852145499001; Caelainn
Hogan, Groups Rush to Prevent Food Crisis in Ebola-Stricken Areas, WASH. POST,
Aug. 28, 2014, at A11, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-
science/groups-rush-to-avoid-food-crisis-in-ebola-stricken-areas/2014/08/27/80285e8a-
2d3d-11e4-994d-202962a9150c_story.html [hereinafter Hogan, Groups]; Adam
Nossiter, Ebola is Taking a Second Toll, on Economies, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 6, 2014, at
A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/06/world/africa/ebola-hurting-african
-economies.html?_r=0.
41. Stephanie Nebehay & James Harding Giahyue, Food Prices Soar in Ebola-Hit




43. Garrett Ingoglia, A Firsthand Account of Life at the Epicenter of the Ebola
Outbreak in Monrovia, Liberia, WORLD POST (Oct. 9, 2014, 10:45 AM), http://
www.huffingtonpost.com/garrett-ingoglia/a-firsthand-account-of-li_b_5958884.html.
44. Hogan, Groups, supra note 40.
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cans are at risk of famine or death from malnutrition.45  According to
the World Bank’s Ebola Impact Index, the total economic impact of
EVD could exceed $32 billion by the end of 2015 if the virus spreads
to neighboring countries in West Africa.46
III. EMERGENCY DECLARATIONS AND SOCIAL DISTANCING
MEASURES
Against this backdrop is the need to address the social and eco-
nomic consequences of Ebola in West Africa and abroad through a
series of legal preparedness efforts to stem its spread.  Formal emer-
gency declarations alter the legal environment to facilitate public
health and medical responses,47 instantly allowing measures that
might otherwise require considerable legal maneuvering absent a
declaration.
Per Appendix 1, Ebola-related Emergency Measures in Select
Countries, governments in Guinea, Liberia, Nigeria, and Sierra Leone
declared emergencies that collectively impact nearly 200 million peo-
ple.48  The declarations differ in form, content, duration, and sub-
stance, but each authorizes an array of flexible powers and
corresponding measures to address the public health impact of Ebola.
For example, each government may close schools, businesses, roads,
or borders. Liberia closed government offices, placing workers on
leave for thirty days to contain the spread of EVD.49  Sierra Leone
declared a national “stay at home” day for reflection, education, and
45. Connor Adams Sheets, Ebola Epidemic 2014: Liberians Threaten to Break
Quarantine Over Food Shortage, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 23, 2014, 3:32 PM), http://
www.ibtimes.com/ebola-epidemic-2014-liberians-threaten-break-quarantine-over-
food-shortage-1711614.
46. The Economic Impact of the 2014 Ebola Epidemic: Short and Medium Term
Estimates for West Africa, THE WORLD BANK GRP. 3 (Oct. 7, 2014), http://www-
wds.worldbank.org/external/default/WDSContentServer/WDSP/IB/2014/10/07/00045
6286_20141007140300/Rendered/PDF/912190WP0see0a00070385314B00PUBLIC
0.pdf; Maryla Maliszewska, Ebola’s Economic Damage to Africa: How Much? How
Long?, WORLD BANK (Oct. 9, 2014), http://blogs.worldbank.org/developmenttalk/
ebola-s-economic-damage-africa-how-much-how-long; Max Ehrenfreund, Fear of
Ebola Could Have “Catastrophic” Economic Costs, World Bank Predicts, WASH.
POST (Oct. 8, 2014), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonkblog/wp/2014/10/08/
fear-of-ebola-could-have-catastrophic-economic-costs-world-bank-predicts/.
47. James G. Hodge, Jr. & Evan D. Anderson, Principles and Practice of Legal
Triage During Public Health Emergencies, 64 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 249, 250
(2008).
48. The World FactBook, U.S. CENT. INTELLIGENCE AGENCY, https://
www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2119rank.html (last
visited Oct. 30, 2014).
49. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of Liber., Special Statement by President El-
len Johnson Sirleaf on Additional Measures in the Fight Against the Ebola Virus
Disease (July 30, 2014), available at http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/Special_State
_Delivered_July%2030.pdf [hereinafter Sirleaf, Statement on Additional Measures].
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prayer.50  Nigeria ordered all schools to remain closed for forty-three
days beyond the usual summer vacation.51  Guinea closed all schools
and universities indefinitely until measures aimed at controlling Ebola
transmission took effect.52
Each country also implemented stringent screening, surveillance,
testing, and treatment measures, including widespread airport-screen-
ing procedures to evaluate passenger temperatures and symptoms.
Nigeria screened all passengers arriving by air and sea in Lagos and
Rivers State and retooled its polio eradication technology and infra-
structure to trace contacts of initial Ebola cases.53  These combined
procedures are credited with the containment of initial cases of Ebola
in Lagos.54  Though purposeful, such measures are imperfect due to
the epidemiology of the disease and limitations of available tests.  As
Ebola is only detectable and transmissible among symptomatic per-
sons, asymptomatic persons, like Thomas Eric Duncan who left Libe-
ria for Dallas, Texas, in late September 2014, can still slip through the
cracks.55  Without an accurate, rapid test for the presence of EVD56 it
takes hours to confirm that someone is infectious.57
While Nigeria was declared “Ebola free,” resource limitations and
other factors present substantial public health challenges to the re-
50. Adam Nossiter, Sierra Leone Deploys Troops in Ebola Crisis, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 5, 2014, at A4, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/06/world/africa/
sierra-leone-deploys-troops-in-ebola-crisis.html.
51. Ebola Outbreak: Nigeria Closes All Schools Until October, BBC NEWS AFR.
(Aug. 27, 2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28950347.  Classes resumed in
several Nigerian states on October 8, 2014, but some teachers refused to work until
back salaries were paid and adequate preventive measures were implemented.
Amaka Abayomi et al., Ebola: Finally, 10 States Resume Nationwide, VANGUARD
(Oct. 9, 2014, 12:22 AM), http://www.vanguardngr.com/2014/10/ebola-finally-10-
states-resume-nationwide/.
52. The Associated Press, Guinea: Schools Reopen as Ebola Ebbs, N.Y. TIMES
(Jan. 19, 2015), http://www.nytimes.com/2015/01/20/world/africa/guinea-schools-reo-
pen-as-ebola-ebbs.html (Schools in Guinea began reopening on January 19, 2015); see
Guinea, INT’L SOS, https://web.archive.org/web/20141113180011/ (last visited Feb. 11,
2015) (accessed by searching for INTERNATIONAL SOS in the Internet Archive Index).
53. Nigeria is Now Free of Ebola Virus Transmission, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct.
20, 2014), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/ebola/20-october-2014/en/ [hereinaf-
ter Nigeria Free of Ebola].
54. Id.  WHO Director Margaret Chan concluded as a result that “any country in
the world experiencing an imported case can hold onward transmission to just a hand-
ful of cases.” Id.
55. Isaac I. Bogoch, Assessment of the Potential for International Dissemination of
Ebola Virus via Commercial Air Travel During the 2014 West African Outbreak, 385
LANCET 29, 30 (2015), available at http://www.thelancet.com/pdfs/journals/lancet/
PIIS0140-6736(14)61828-6.pdf.
56. Andrew Pollack, Researchers Seek Crucial Tool: A Fast, Finger-Prick Ebola
Test, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 5, 2014, at B2, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/11/05/
business/ebola-researchers-rush-to-find-a-fast-diagnostic-test.html?action=CLick&
contentCollection=us%20Open&region=article&module=promotron.
57. Donald G. McNeil, Jr., Ask Well: Ebola Testing for All New Arrivals?, N.Y.
TIMES (Oct. 25, 2014), http://well.blogs.nytimes.com/2014/10/25/ask-well-ebola-testing
-for-all-new-arrivals/.
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maining affected West African countries.  Facing thousands of active
cases of Ebola, governmental authorities in Liberia58 and Sierra Le-
one59 have instituted fourteen of the fifteen emergency measures
listed in Appendix 1 including:
1. mandatory disinfection of all public facilities;
2. prohibitions on price increases;
3. waivers of import duties for certain sanitation products;
4. isolation of infected persons or quarantine of those exposed;
5. restrictions on public meetings and gatherings;
6. increasing surveillance and house-to-house searches;
7. border closures and travel curfews; and
8. lockdowns of entire communities.
Many of these measures may be considered extreme depending on the
duration of emergency declarations, which can last for as few as ninety
days (e.g., Liberia)60 or indefinitely (e.g., Guinea).61
Though expansive, these interventions are constitutionally author-
ized in most nations affected by Ebola.  Sierra Leone’s constitution
allows the President to “take such measures as appear . . . necessary or
expedient for the purpose of maintaining and securing peace, order
and good government” during a public emergency.62  Constitutions in
58. Sirleaf, Statement on Additional Measures, supra note 49.
59. Ernest Bai Koroma, President of Sierra Leone, Address to the Nation on the
Ebola Outbreak by His Excellency the President Dr. Ernest Bai Koroma (July 30,
2014), available at http://www.statehouse.gov.sl/index.php/component/content/article/
34-news-articles/925-address-to-the-nation-on-the-ebola-outbreak-by-his-excellency-
the-president-dr-ernest-bai-koroma-july-30-2014 [hereinafter Address to the Nation];
Ernest Bai Koroma, President of Sierra Leone, Broadcast to the Nation on Further
Measures to End the Ebola Outbreak by His Excellency the President Dr. Ernest Bai
Koroma (Sept. 24, 2014), available at http://www.statehouse.gov.sl/index.php/useful-
links/1000-broadcast-to-the-nation-on-further-measures-to-end-the-ebola-outbreak-
by-his-excellency-the-president-dr-ernest-bai-koroma-september-24-2014.
60. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of Liber., Statement Delivered by H. E. Ellen
Johnson Sirleaf President of Liberia on the Lifting of the State of Emergency (Nov.
13, 2014), available at http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/State%20of%20Emergency
%20Speech%20(Presedits).pdf (on November 13, 2014, President Sirleaf opted not to
extend the emergency declaration in Liberia, citing progress made and public health
powers available to continue the fight against Ebola).
61. See CONSTITUTION OF GUINEA 7 May 2010, title 5, art. 90, available at http://
unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/unpan/unpan049269.pdf (the consti-
tutional limit to the duration of an emergency declaration in Guinea is twelve days,
unless extended by the National Assembly).  However, in declaring an emergency,
President Alpha Conde´ formally banned persons “from leaving their homes until the
end of their surveillance period” and instituted a ban on moving bodies “from one
town to another until the end of the epidemic.” Guinea Declares a National Health
Emergency, JAMAICA OBSERVER (Aug. 13, 2014, 7:39 PM), http://
www.jamaicaobserver.com/news/Guinea-declares-Ebola-a--national-health-
emergency.
62. CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE 1991, Act. No. 6, § 29(5), available at http://
www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/constitution1991.pdf.
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Guinea and Liberia similarly grant leaders leeway to coordinate and
implement emergency response plans and to designate officials or en-
tities in charge.
Most of these countries’ constitutions also permit restricting certain
public rights during emergencies.  Explicit restraints on freedoms of
assembly and association are constitutionally authorized in Nigeria
and Sierra Leone,63 paving the way for significant enforcement of so-
cial distancing measures.  The constitutions of Liberia, Nigeria, and
Sierra Leone allow use of forced or compulsory labor during emer-
gency periods,64 which could potentially authorize forced deployment
of security forces65 and HCWs.66  Individual and group detentions are
also permitted despite explicit infringements of personal rights to
travel and assemble.  Constitutional provisions in Nigeria, Sierra Le-
one, and Liberia authorize warranted border restrictions, regardless of
an emergency declaration,67 despite WHO’s rejection of such prac-
tices due to inhibitions on trade of essential medical goods.68  Only
63. See CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA 1999, § 45(1)(a), available at http://www.wipo.
int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=179202; CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE, Act. No. 6,
§ 26(2)(a)(i) 1991, available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/constitution1991.pdf.
64. See CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA 1999, § 43(2)(d), available at http://
www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=179202; CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA LEONE
1991, Act. No. 6, § 19(2)(d), available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/constitu-
tion1991.pdf; CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA 1986, § 12, available at
http://www.liberianlegal.com/constitution1986.htm.
65. Liberia and Sierra Leone have deployed security forces to enforce Ebola con-
tainment measures, yet it is unclear if their deployment was “forced.”  Anne Look,
Liberia, Sierra Leone Deploy Troops to Contain Ebola, VOICE OF AM. (Aug. 8, 2014),
http://www.voanews.com/content/liberia-sierra-leone-deploy-troops-to-contain-ebola/
2407268.html.
66. Ebola Situation in Liberia: Non-Conventional Interventions Needed, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/ebola/8-septem
ber-2014/en/.
67. Nigeria’s constitution authorizes suspending freedom of movement rights
when “reasonably justifiable . . . in the interest of defense, public safety, public order,
public morality or public health.” CONSTITUTION OF NIGERIA 1999, § 45, available at
http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file_id=179202.  Liberian constitutional pow-
ers provide exemption to one’s freedom of movement, as long as the restriction pro-
tects the public’s health. CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF LIBERIA 1986, art. 13,
available at http://www.liberianlegal.com/constitution1986.htm.  Sierra Leone’s Con-
stitution allows exclusion of non-citizens in addition to restricting movement within
defined localities, as deemed necessary by the President. CONSTITUTION OF SIERRA
LEONE 1991, Act. No. 6, § 29(6)(a), available at http://www.sierra-leone.org/Laws/
constitution1991.pdf.
68. Ebola and Marburg Virus Disease Epidemics: Preparedness, Alert, Control,
and Evaluation, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 32 (Aug., 2014), http://apps.who.int/iris/bit
stream/10665/130160/1/WHO_HSE_PED_CED_2014.05_eng.pdf?ua=1&ua=1 [here-
inafter WORLD HEALTH ORG, Ebola and Marburg].  WHO asserts that such coercive
measures would increase economic hardship and uncontrolled migration of people
from affected countries, resulting in a higher risk of international Ebola transmission.
Statement on the 3th Meeting of the IHR Emergency Committee Regarding the 2014
Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 23, 2014), http://
www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/ebola-3rd-ihr-meeting/en/.
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Guinea’s constitution notes that emergency circumstances do not jus-
tify suspension of human rights.69
On August 19, 2014, Liberia implemented a twenty-one-day quar-
antine of over 50,000 people in a Monrovian slum70 following an at-
tack on an Ebola clinic.  Facing public resistance and scrutiny, efforts
to cordon the area were largely ineffective and lifted after just ten
days.71  In Sierra Leone, the President ordered a three-day national
lockdown instructing citizens to remain indoors from September
19–21.72  During this time, outreach workers canvassed residences ed-
ucating the public on Ebola, handing out soap, identifying active
cases, and removing bodies of EVD victims.73  Countries like Sene-
gal,74 Nigeria,75 Spain, France, Mali, and the United States76 have also
isolated infected persons in health care settings to limit the numbers
of Ebola cases in their jurisdictions.77
Restrictive measures like these, often enforced by the country’s mil-
itary or police forces, may be legally prescribed to contain infectious
conditions or stymie acts of public resistance, fear, and denial.78  Con-
cerning a condition like Ebola that can kill over half its victims in
relatively short order, social distancing and other measures may ar-
guably help control its spread.  When such powers are abused, how-
69. See CONSTITUTION OF GUINEA May 7, 2010, title 2, art. 6 (2010), available at
http://unpan1.un.org/intradoc/groups/public/documents/unpan/unpan049269.pdf.
70. Norimitsu Onishi, Clashes Erupt as Liberia Sets an Ebola Quarantine, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 21, 2014, at A1, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/08/21/world/
africa/ebola-outbreak-liberia-quarantine.html?_r=0.
71. Clair MacDougall, Liberian Government’s Blunders Pile Up in the Grip of
Ebola, TIME (Sept. 2, 2014), http://time.com/3247089/liberia-west-point-quarantine-
monrovia/.
72. Adam Nossiter, Sierra Leone to Institute Three-Day Ebola Quarantine, N.Y.
TIMES (Sept. 7, 2014), at A12, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/09/07/world/
africa/sierra-leone-to-impose-widespread-ebola-quarantine.html.
73. Chelsea J. Carter & Umaru Fofana, Sierra Leone Plans Nationwide Lockdown
to Stop Spread of Ebola, CNN (Sept. 8, 2014), http://www.cnn.com/2014/09/06/world/
africa/sierra-leone-ebola-lockdown/.
74. The Outbreak of Ebola Virus Disease in Senegal is Over, WORLD HEALTH
ORG. (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/ebola/17-october-2014/
en/.
75. Faisal Shuaib et al., Ebola Virus Disease Outbreak—Nigeria, July–September
2014, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 867, Oct. 3, 2014, http://
www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6339a5.htm?s_cid=mm6339a5_w; Nigeria
Free of Ebola, supra note 53.
76. Neil Versel, Alleged Lapse in Protocols With Ebola Patient Should Surprise
Nobody, FORBES (Oct. 15, 2014, 12:36 PM), http://www.forbes.com/sites/neilversel/
2014/10/15/alleged-lapse-in-protocols-with-ebola-patient-happens-should-surprise-no
body/.
77. Farai Gundan, Official: The World Health Organization Declares Senegal and
Nigeria Free from Ebola, FORBES (Oct. 23, 2014, 2:16 PM), http://www.forbes.com/
sites/faraigundan/2014/10/23/official-the-world-health-organization-declares-senegal-
and-nigeria-free-from-ebola/.
78. MacDougall, supra note 71.
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ever, they can unjustifiably infringe on human rights and freedoms to
the detriment of the public’s health.
IV. EMERGENCY RESPONSES AND HUMAN RIGHTS
Overzealous and unfounded disease control measures can impinge
basic human rights leading ultimately to the spread of disease detri-
mental to the public’s health.  Human rights are universal principles79
that include positive rights to life, liberty, security, travel, health, food,
housing, and education, as well as freedoms of movement, of religious
belief, and from discrimination.80  Health and human rights pioneer
Jonathan Mann observed during the HIV/AIDS epidemic that threat-
ening and excluding infected persons tend to drive cases of HIV un-
derground, thwarting education and prevention efforts.81  Mann’s
research illustrates how protecting and promoting health and human
rights are linked.82  The United Nation’s High Commissioner for
Human Rights, Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, echoed Mann’s wisdom in
emphasizing how respect for human rights can prevent and cure dis-
ease, while ill-advised measures can drive cases underground.83
Still, thirty years later, restrictive public health measures that may
infringe upon human rights are being implemented in response to
Ebola.84  As noted in Part II, a lack of functioning health care facilities
in Ebola-affected countries denies individuals access to basic health
care services85 in contravention of their human right to health.  Devel-
oped countries also have a duty to provide international assistance to
developing nations to realize fulfillment of their human rights
obligations.
79. Nearly all countries have ratified the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights (“ICESCR”) and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights (“ICCPR”), including Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia. LAWRENCE
O. GOSTIN, GLOBAL HEALTH L. 243–44 (2014).
80. International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies & Francois-
Xavier Bagnoud Center for Health and Human Rights, Human Rights: An Introduc-
tion, in HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A READER 21 (Jonathan Mann et al. eds.,
1999); Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, U.N. Doc. A/
RES/217(III) (Dec. 10, 1948).
81. HEALTH AND HUMAN RIGHTS: A READER 5 (Jonathan Mann et al. eds.,
1999); Patrick M. Eba, Commentary, Ebola and Human Rights in West Africa, 384
LANCET 2091 (2014), available at http://ac.els-cdn.com/S0140673614614124/1-s2.0-
S0140673614614124-main.pdf?_tid=1b30a140-b262-11e4-981a-00000aab0f01&acdnat=
1423709696_9a3898f74ddfba393c2a7b301ac3fa44.
82. GOSTIN, supra note 79, at 244; see generally Elizabeth Fee & Manon Parry,
Jonathan Mann, HIV/AIDS, and Human Rights, 29 J. PUB. HEALTH POL. 54 (2008).
83. Press Conference by Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein, U.N. High Commissioner for
Human Rights (Oct. 16, 2014), available at http://www.ohchr.org/EN/NewsEvents/
Pages/DisplayNews.aspx?NewsID=15173&LangID=E.
84. Jonathan Mann et al., Health and Human Rights, in HEALTH AND HUMAN
RIGHTS: A READER 7, 13 (Jonathan Mann et al. eds., 1999).
85. Onishi, supra note 70.
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Yet, human rights are not absolute. In times of crisis, they may be
restricted.  The Siracusa Principles86 identify circumstances in which
public health measures, like quarantine, may restrict human rights.
Restrictions must: (1) be provided for and carried out in accordance
with the law; (2) advance a legitimate objective of general interest; (3)
be strictly necessary in a democratic society to achieve the objective;
(4) represent the least intrusive means available to achieve the objec-
tive; (5) be based on scientific evidence and not drafted or imposed
arbitrarily;87 (6) be subject to review;88 and (7) be limited in dura-
tion.89  Public health control measures that comply with the Siracusa
Principles may justifiably infringe on human rights.
In other cases, infringements may be unacceptable,90 including
through overzealous applications of social distancing measures in re-
sponse to Ebola.  Doctors Without Borders suggested Sierra Leone’s
three-day lockdown, for example, led individuals to hide their symp-
toms and deceased family members and deprived the poor of access to
increasingly expensive food.91  On August 7, 2014, Sierra Leone’s
army reportedly blockaded Ebola-affected areas, limiting persons’
rights to travel (whether infected or not) and impeding their ability to
obtain necessities.92  Human Rights Watch alleged Liberia’s ten-day
quarantine93 of thousands of residents in West Point, Monrovia, signif-
icantly and disproportionally affected the poor, elderly, and others un-
able to evade restriction,94 in contravention of multiple Siracusa
Principles.95  Closures of borders and markets, movement restrictions,
86. United Nations, Econ. & Soc. Council, Siracusa Principles on the Limitation
and Derogation Provisions in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1985/4, Annex (1985), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/
instree/siracusaprinciples.html [hereinafter Siracusa Principles].
87. Id. at Annex IA; WHO Guidance on Human Rights and Involuntary Detention
for xdr-tb Control, WORLD HEALTH ORG. (Jan. 24, 2007), http://www.who.int/tb/
features_archive/involuntary_treatment/en/.
88. Siracusa Principles, supra note 86, at Annex IIC.
89. Id.
90. GOSTIN, supra note 79, at 244.
91. Lizzie Dearden, Ebola Virus Outbreak: 92 Bodies Recovered as More Cases
Found in Sierra Leone Lockdown, INDEPENDENT (Sept. 22, 2014), http://
www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/ebola-outbreak-92-bodies-recovered-as-
more-cases-found-in-sierra-leone-lockdown-9748181.html.
92. Umaru Fofana & Clair MacDougall, Sierra Leone Army Blockades Ebola Ar-
eas, Liberia Declares Emergency, REUTERS (Aug. 7, 2014, 7:20 PM), http://www.
reuters.com/article/2014/08/07/us-health-ebola-africa-idUSKBN0G70WW20140807.
93. Kevin Hartnett, With Ebola, Mass Quarantine is Back, BOS. GLOBE (Oct. 3,
2014), http://www.bostonglobe.com/ideas/2014/10/03/with-ebola-mass-quarantine-
back/dpLJ0IYYTwdHk1AFUY1QGP/story.html; External Situation Report, U.N.
MISSION FOR EBOLA EMERGENCY RESPONSE (Oct. 9, 2014), http://ebolaresponse.un.
org/sites/default/files/situation_report-ebola-09oct14.pdf.
94. West Africa: Respect Rights in Ebola Response, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Sept. 15,
2014), http://www.hrw.org/news/2014/09/15/west-africa-respect-rights-ebola-response.
95. Fiona Lander, Human Rights and Ebola: The Issue of Quarantine, PLOS
BLOGS (Nov. 5, 2014), http://blogs.plos.org/globalhealth/2014/11/ebola_and_human
_rights/.
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and a lack of able workers caused food prices to escalate in Sierra
Leone and Liberia.96  Liberian officers reportedly seized belongings of
those violating curfew and extorted individuals at checkpoints.97
When the border between Liberia and Sierra Leone was closed in
mid-August, Liberian armed forces were ordered to shoot on-sight an-
yone unlawfully entering the country.98  In late October, forty-three
people quarantined in Jenewonda, Liberia, threatened to break out
because they had no food.99  These and other reports implicate serious
violations of human rights to life, health, security, freedom, and food
outside the bounds of Siracusa Principles.
HCWs attempting to provide medical care and public health ser-
vices have been harassed and attacked due to a lack of EVD educa-
tion and mistrust.  Eight HCWs were brutally murdered in Guinea
while educating the public on how to prevent the spread of Ebola.100
Survivors, family members of those infected with Ebola, and orphans
have been ostracized and discriminated against, leaving them without
adequate food, housing, and care.101
WHO warned against national travel bans and restrictions, arguing
they will lead to human rights violations and worsened health out-
comes by undermining response efforts.102 Still multiple countries
have imposed bans.  Saudi Arabia denied visas to 7,000 West African
Muslims registered for the Hajj.103  Developed countries have re-
stricted flights and other travel to and from the affected regions.  In
late October, Australia announced that it will not process any visas
from Ebola-affected countries; those who already have visas may only
enter the country after serving a twenty-one-day quarantine prior to
96. Nebehay & Giahyue, supra note 41.
97. UNMEER, supra note 93.
98. APA, Liberia: Border Guards Given Shoot-on-Site Orders, STAR AFRICA
(Aug. 18, 2014, 3:42 PM), http://en.starafrica.com/news/liberia-border-guards-given-
shoot-on-sight-orders.html.
99. External Situation Report, UNMEER (Oct. 24, 2014), http://ebolaresponse
.un.org/sites/default/files/situation_report-ebola-24oct14.pdf; Jonathan Paye-Layleh &
Clarence Roy-Macaulay, Threat to Break Isolation in Liberia Over Food, ASSOCI-
ATED PRESS (Oct. 23, 2014, 10:06), http://www.usnews.com/news/world/articles/2014/
10/23/threat-to-break-isolation-in-liberia-over-food.
100. Ebola Outbreak: Guinea Health Team Killed, BBC NEWS AFR. (Sept. 19,
2014), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-29256443.
101. Michelle Nichols & James Harding Giahyue, Defying Stigma, Survivors Join
the Ebola Fight in West Africa, REUTERS AFR. (Oct. 27, 2014, 6:46 PM), http://
af.reuters.com/article/nigeriaNews/idAFL5N0SM2GE20141027?feedTypeRSS&feed
Name=NigeriaNews&sp=true.
102. Caelainn Hogan, WHO Wary of Ebola Travel Bans, WASH. POST, Aug. 19,
2014, at A02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/national/health-science/
2014/08/19/83da2974-26f2-11e4-8593-da634b334390_story.html.
103. UN Ebola Crisis Centre: External Situation Report, UNMEER (Oct. 2, 2014),
http://ebolaresponse.un.org/sites/default/files/situation_report-ebola-02oct14.pdf.
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their departure.104  Days later, Canada followed with similar restric-
tions.105  Singapore announced that citizens of Liberia, Guinea, and
Sierra Leone need a visa to enter effective November 5, 2014.106
Awareness of these and other human rights implications has led the
UN, UNICEF, and others to limit negative impacts.  The UN is train-
ing armed forces in Freetown, Sierra Leone to institute proper proce-
dures at checkpoints, screening areas, and quarantines that respect
human rights, including assuring adequate access to food and water
for affected persons.107  UNICEF and Liberian partners opened a
dedicated children’s care center for those who have lost a parent or
parents to Ebola and must undergo quarantine.108  UNICEF plans to
train 2,500 Ebola survivors (assumed to be immune to the disease) to
care for quarantined and orphaned children and to assist in reuniting
families.109  Despite a slow and criticized international response, over
half of WHO’s $988 million plan has been funded and another $279
million pledged.110  The UN Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
Office estimates countries have committed $894 million and pledged
another $928 million for preparedness needs.111  International pledges
of HCWs, other personnel, and resources continue to rise.112
V. EMPIRICAL FOUNDATIONS OF PUBLIC HEALTH LEGAL
MEASURES
In the throes of a highly infectious and deadly disease within re-
source-poor West African countries facing thousands of current and
future cases and major collateral harms, a plethora of public health
measures to counter Ebola may seem viable.  However, three critical
questions underlying the justified use of any restrictive public health
104. Euan McKirdy, Australia Instigates Ebola-Prompted Ban on Travel from West
Africa, CNN, http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/28/world/asia/australia-immigration-policy-
ebola/ (last updated Oct. 28, 2014, 3:57 PM).
105. Ebola Crisis: Canada Visa Ban Hits West Africa States, BBC NEWS U.S. &
CAN. (Nov. 1, 2012), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-us-canada-29861563.
106. Claire Huang, Nationals from Ebola-Hit West African Countries Need Visa to
Enter Singapore from Nov 5, BUS. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2014), http://www.businesstimes
.com.sg/government-economy/nationals-from-ebola-hit-west-african-countries-need-
visa-to-enter-singapore-from.




110. TIAJI SALAAM-BLYTHER, CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERV., RL43697, U.S.
AND INTERNATIONAL HEALTH RESPONSES TO THE EBOLA OUTBREAK IN WEST AF-
RICA, 12–13 (2014), available at http://fas.org/sgp/crs/row/R43697.pdf.
111. Id. at 13.
112. The U.S. currently has 900 governmental employees in West Africa, Britain
sent 750 troops, including some medical officers, China pledged 170 health workers,
Cuba pledged 165 HCWs, and the East African Community has deployed 600 work-
ers; in addition, many other nations are providing financial and medical resources to
fight Ebola outbreaks. Id. at 14–15.
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intervention must be asked. First, is the intervention authorized by
routine or emergency public health laws in the affected jurisdic-
tion?113  Second, does implementation of the intervention negatively
impact the human rights of individuals without public health justifica-
tion?114  If so, the measure may fail to promote global health based on
existing theory and research.
Finally, is the public health measure efficacious?  Public health mea-
sures that are lawful and consistent with human rights norms may still
fail to effectively control diseases.  Conversely, measures of questiona-
ble legality that infringe upon human rights may prove efficacious.
These issues are addressed below through three case studies—focused
on the efficacy of isolation, border closure, and lockdown—and re-
lated observations about the essential facets of efficacy of public
health legal measures to control emerging infectious diseases.
A. Case Study 1 – Isolation
Isolation of patients with highly infectious diseases,115 including
EVD,116 is routinely used to prevent the spread of the illness to pa-
tients, HCWs, family members, or others.  Research suggests the prac-
tice curtails disease transmission, especially concerning conditions like
Ebola that are not as easily transmitted as airborne viruses like influ-
enza or measles.117  Proper use of barrier-nursing techniques and iso-
lation of infected patients has historically been effective in reducing
transmission to HCWs and limiting the spread of EVD in the greater
community.118
113. See supra Part III.
114. See supra Part IV.
115. Isolation is “the separation, for the period of communicability, of known in-
fected persons in such places and under such conditions as to prevent or limit the
transmission of the infectious agent.”  Lawrence O. Gostin & Benjamin E. Berkman,
Pandemic Influenza: Ethics, Law, and the Public’s Health, 59 ADMIN. L. REV. 121, 171
(2007).
116. CDC guidance from October 2014, as updated on February  12, 2015, recom-
mends isolation for confirmed and suspected cases of EVD. Identify, Isolate, Inform:
Emergency Department Evaluation and Management for Patients Who Present with
Possible Ebola Virus Disease, U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION
(Feb. 12, 2015), http://www.cdc.gov/vhf/ebola/hcp/ed-management-patients-possible-
ebola.html.
117. See generally Christophe Fraser et al., Factors That Make an Infectious Disease
Outbreak Controllable, 101 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 6146 (2004) (isolation effec-
tive against SARS and other illnesses with post-symptomatic infectivity and moderate
transmissibility, but not effective against influenza, using mathematical models).
118. For example, in the 1995 EVD outbreak in Kikwit, 67 HCWs became infected
and 47 died prior to the implementation of proper patient isolation and the use of
protective gear; only 3 infections occurred after implementation.  Barbara Kerstie¨ns
& Francine Matthys, Interventions to Control Virus Transmission During an Outbreak
of Ebola Hemorrhagic Fever: Experience from Kikwit, Democratic Republic of the
Congo, 1995, 179 (Supp. 1) J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES S263, S267 (1999) (“Key ele-
ments in the control of an [EVD] outbreak are the organization of an adequate isola-
tion unit for suspected cases and the use of proper barrier-nursing techniques, using
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Isolation nevertheless has some significant potential drawbacks.  Its
practice requires significant resources119 and impacts individuals’ per-
sonal liberties.120  Isolated patients experience negative mental health
effects, including depression, anxiety, and anger, and report dissatis-
faction with their treatment.121  Dr. Kent Brantly, one of the first
Western doctors to survive Ebola, described his isolation as a lonely
experience: “I needed help to go to the bathroom, I needed water to
drink. . . . I was scared and there was nobody there.”122  HCWs may
spend less time with isolated patients who thus experience more ad-
verse events and failures of supportive care.123
Significant debates among researchers and mathematical modelers
challenge a presumption of efficacy of isolation in all cases.  While
evidence from past EVD outbreaks supports the efficacy of isolation,
empirical evidence that isolation reduces disease transmission is lack-
ing for some illnesses, including methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus
aureus (“MRSA”), influenza, and HIV.124  Theoretical modeling test-
ing isolation’s efficacy has indicated that isolation should be more ef-
fective against EVD than several other illnesses.  For example,
mathematical models of the 2003 severe acute respiratory syndrome
protective equipment in adequate quantities”). See also C.J. Peters & J.W. LeDuc,
An Introduction to Ebola: The Virus and the Disease, 179 (Supp. 1) J. INFECTIOUS
DISEASES ix (1999) (reviewing multiple past outbreaks); G. Chowell et al., The Basic
Reproductive Number of Ebola and the Effects of Public Health Measures: The Cases
of Congo and Uganda, 229 J. THEORETICAL BIOLOGY 119, 121 (2004) (isolation and
protective equipment helped halt the 1995 and 2000 outbreaks); M. Lamunu et al.,
Containing a Haemorrhagic Fever Epidemic: The Ebola Experience in Uganda (Octo-
ber 2000-January 2001), 8 INT’L J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES 27, 28 (2004) (isolation and
other control interventions were “very successful in containing the epidemic” in
Uganda in 2000-2001); R.T. Emond et al., A Case of Ebola Virus Infection, 2 BRIT.
MED. J. 541 (1977) (isolation of the single patient and barrier-nursing techniques pre-
vented any further infections).
119. Kathryn B. Kirkland, Taking off the Gloves: Toward a Less Dogmatic Ap-
proach to the Use of Contact Isolation, 48 CLINICAL INFECTIOUS DISEASES 766, 766
(2009) (“[I]solation has costs, including the opportunity costs associated with the use
of health care resources.”).
120. Gostin & Berkman, supra note 115, at 172.
121. C. Abad et al., Adverse Effects of Isolation in Hospitalized Patients: A System-
atic Review, 76 J. HOSPITAL INFECTION 97 (2010); Mark Cole & Louise Lai, Reviewing
the Efficacy of Infection Control Isolation, 18 BRIT. J. NURSING 403 (2009); Kirkland,
supra note 119, at 766.  These three reviews focused mainly on studies of patients with
infections like MRSA for which only contact isolation is used, though a few of the
studies concerned patients experiencing more severe forms of isolation for illnesses
such as SARS.
122. Betsy McKay, In Depth: Ebola Patients Tread Painful, Lonely Journeys to Re-
covery, WALL ST. J. (ASIA), Nov. 3, 2014, at 16, available at http://online.wsj.com/
articles/u-s-ebola-survivors-tread-painful-lonely-journeys-1414801784.
123. Abad et al., supra note 121, at 99, 101; Kirkland, supra note 119, at 768.
124. Kirkland, supra note 119, at 767 (evidence lacking on contact isolation’s effi-
cacy against MRSA infections); Cole & Lai, supra note 121, at 404 (evidence lacking
on contact isolation’s efficacy against MRSA infections); Fraser et al., supra note 117,
at 6151 (arguing that isolation, contact tracing, and quarantine are unlikely to be suc-
cessful against an influenza or HIV outbreak via mathematical models).
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(“SARS”) outbreak indicated its control was made possible solely
through isolation.125  Modeling data based on the 2014 EVD outbreak
in Liberia, however, suggests that isolation alone is insufficient to con-
tain the disease.126  Only in combination with other control measures,
such as sanitary burial, contact tracing, and quarantine, may it limit
the spread of Ebola.127
Patient isolation can be effective, but it is not failsafe due to key
practical difficulties.  Delays in implementing isolation and other con-
trol measures reduce their effectiveness.128  Even with proper equip-
ment and training, compliance with isolation procedures is rarely
100%.129  Studies suggest HCW compliance rates fall below 30% for
illnesses requiring only contact isolation, such as MRSA.130  Even af-
ter isolation, Ebola patients and corpses can transmit EVD.  The iso-
lation of Thomas Eric Duncan still resulted in at least two HCWs
contracting Ebola.131  In Spain, a HCW was infected while providing
treatment132 amidst reported lapses in the hospital’s existing isolation
and treatment protocols.133 Still, with sufficient resources and sound
execution, patient isolation can slow the spread of EVD, as shown in
past outbreaks, and remains a key component of any intervention
strategy against Ebola.
125. Fraser et al., supra note 117, at 6151 (finding that isolation alone could contain
an outbreak of an illness like SARS, with only post-symptomatic infectivity and mod-
erate transmissibility); Abba B. Gumel et al., Modelling Strategies for Controlling
SARS Outbreaks, 271 PROC. ROYAL SOC’Y LONDON B 2223, 2223 (2004); James O.
Lloyd-Smith, Alison P. Galvani & Wayne M. Getz, Curtailing Transmission of Severe
Acute Respiratory Syndrome Within a Community and its Hospital, 270 PROC. ROYAL
SOC’Y LONDON B 1979, 1979 (2003).
126. Abhishek Pandey et al., Strategies for Containing Ebola in West Africa, 346
SCIENCE 991, 991 (2014), available at http://www.sciencemag.org/content/early/2014/
10/29/science.1260612.full.
127. Id. at 993–94; Chowell et al., supra note 118, at 124–25 (aggregated control
measures include surveillance, quarantine, education on strict barrier nursing tech-
niques [including isolation] and the rapid burial or cremation of deceased patients).
128. Fraser et al., supra note 117, at 6150; J. Legrand et al., Understanding the Dy-
namics of Ebola Epidemics, 135 EPIDEMIOLOGY INFECTION 610, 610 (2006) (mathe-
matical model of an EVD epidemic demonstrating the importance of rapid institution
of control measures); Chowell et al., supra note 118, at 119 (mathematical model
showing a two-week delay in implementing control measures doubles the final EVD
epidemic size).
129. Even 90% isolation would be difficult if not impossible to achieve in West
Africa.  Pandey et al., supra note 126, at 994.
130. Cole & Lai, supra note 121, at 406 (noting that HCW compliance in another
study increased to 97% when dealing with feces, lending to potential increased com-
pliance with a known deadly pathogen such as EVD).
131. Versel, supra note 76.
132. EBOLA RESPONSE ROADMAP SITUATION REPORT, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 1, 9
(2014), http://apps.who.int/iris/bitstream/10665/137376/1/roadmapsitrep_29Oct
2014_eng.pdf.
133. Ilan Brat et al., Workers at Madrid Hospital Say Spain Was Ill-Prepared for
Ebola, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 15, 2014, 7:05 AM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/workers-
at-madrid-hospital-say-spain-was-ill-prepared-for-ebola-1413320546?KEYWORDS=
Spain%20ebola.
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B. Case Study 2 – Border Closures
Border closures entail multiple types of prohibitions on individuals’
entry into or exit from countries or regions via land, air, or water.134
They have been used in prior large-scale outbreaks, such as the SARS
epidemic. 135  However, WHO has consistently recommended against
border closures in response to Ebola.136  The International Federation
of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies described border closures as
“very irrational.”137  Nevertheless, these powers have been used ex-
tensively in countries impacted by Ebola, as well as those seeking to
prevent its importation.
On June 11, 2014, Sierra Leone closed its borders with Guinea and
Liberia to bolster Ebola containment efforts after confirming sixteen
cases.138  On July 27, Liberia closed all but three of its border entry
points in an effort to screen all travelers for Ebola.139  Liberia and
Sierra Leone closed borders well before issuing formal emergency
declarations.140  Guinea officially shut its borders on August 9, just
134. Security Message for U.S. Citizens: Dakar (Senegal), Border Closures Due to
Ebola Virus Disease, OVERSEAS SEC. ADVISORY COUNCIL (Aug. 25, 2014), https://
www.osac.gov/pages/ContentReportDetails.aspx?cid=16206.
135. See CDC Telebriefing on Ebola Outbreak in West Africa, U.S. CTRS, FOR DIS-
EASE CONTROL (July 28, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://www.cdc.gov/media/releases/2014/
t0728-ebola.html; Drew Hinshaw & Betsy Mckay, West Africa Strains to Contain
Ebola Virus, WALL ST. J. (July 29, 2014, 2:45 PM), http://online.wsj.com/articles/libe-
ria-shuts-borders-amid-ebola-outbreak-1406568519; Influenza Pandemic in Australia
1918-19, Melbourne Statistics, AUSTRALIAN POSTAL HIST. & STAT., http://www.aus
postalhistory.com/articles/1123.php (last visited Oct. 31, 2014); Sue Chan, China
Blocks Borders Over SARS, CBS NEWS (May 2, 2003, 4:49 PM), http://
www.cbsnews.com/news/china-blocks-borders-over-sars; Kate Saunders, Tibet Border
with Nepal Closed to Prevent Spread of SARS, PHAYUL.COM (Apr. 27, 2003, 10:30
AM), http://www.phayul.com/news/article.aspx?id=4104&t=1; Michael Wines, The
SARS Epidemic: Moscow; Russia Urges Travel Limit on Suspicion of SARS Case,
N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 2003, at A13, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2003/05/09/
world/the-sars-epidemic-moscow-russia-urges-travel-limit-on-suspicion-of-sars-case
.html.
136. Travel and transport risk assessment: Interim guidance for public health author-
ities and the transport sector, WORLD HEALTH ORG. 6–7, http://apps.who.int/iris/bit
stream/10665/132168/1/WHO_EVD_Guidance_TravelTransportRisk_14.1_eng.pdf?ua
=1&ua=1 (last visited Feb. 12, 2014).
137. Michael Martina, Red Cross Head Says Ebola Travel Bans ‘Irrational,’
REUTERS (Oct. 22, 2014, 5:33 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/10/22/us-
health-ebola-redcross-idUSKCN0IB0WF20141022.
138. Umaru Fofana, Sierra Leone Shuts Borders, Closes Schools to Fight Ebola,
REUTERS (June 11, 2014, 8:55 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/06/11/us-health-
ebola-leone-idUKKBN0EM2CG20140611.
139. Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, President of Liber., A Special Statement by the Presi-
dent (July 27, 2014), available at http://www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/Special%20State-
ment%20by%20President%20Ellen%20Johnson%20Sirleaf%20-1_1.pdf.
140. Formal states of emergency were not declared until July 30, 2014, in Sierra
Leone and August 6, 2014, in Liberia. See Address to Nation, supra note 59; Ellen
Johnson Sirleaf, President of Liber., Statement on the Declaration of Emergency by
President Ellen Johnson Sirleaf, R.L. (Aug. 6, 2014), available at http://
www.emansion.gov.lr/doc/sdseg.pdf.
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days after WHO declared a PHEIC.141  Senegal closed its land bor-
ders with Guinea and air borders with Nigeria, Sierra Leone, and Li-
beria. 142  Cote d’Ivorie shut off its borders with Nigeria, Liberia, and
Sierra Leone.143  In late October, several countries stopped issuing
visas to persons from the regions most affected by the virus.144
Border closures can potentially derail the flow of Ebola into a coun-
try, but also can limit importation of HCWs,145 food, and medical sup-
plies to needed areas,146 effectively cutting off impacted regions.147
Without sufficient enforcement, border closures may be futile.148
Measuring their effectiveness is difficult in part because they are gen-
erally used in conjunction with other disease prevention measures.149
However, some studies have used mathematical simulation models to
estimate the spread of influenza due to border restrictions.  In 2006,
researchers used a large-scale epidemic simulation to examine poten-
tial intervention options to address a novel influenza outbreak in
Great Britain or the United States. 150  Researchers found that border
restrictions, even if 99.9% effective, may delay the peak of the U.S.
pandemic by six weeks, but would not prevent the spread entirely.151
Another study examined the spread of flu following flight restrictions
141. Saliou Samb, Guinea Shuts Borders with Sierra Leone, Liberia in Bid to Halt
Ebola, REUTERS (Aug. 9, 2014, 11:09 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/08/09/uk-
health-ebola-borders-idUKKBN0G90DN20140809.
142. Travel Restrictions, Flight Operations and Screening, INT’L SOS, https://
www.internationalsos.com/ebola/index.cfm?content_id=435& (last updated Jan. 28,
2015).
143. Id.
144. Ralph Ellis, Canada to Stop Processing Visas from Ebola Hot Spots in West
Africa, CNN (Oct. 31, 2014, 6:05 PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/10/31/world/world-
ebola-outbreak.
145. Heidi Vogt, Travel Restrictions Hamper African Medical Staff in Ebola Fight,
WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2014), http://online.wsj.com/articles/travel-restrictions-hamper-
african-medical-staff-in-ebola-fight-1414086147.  WHO recommends health authori-
ties conduct an in-depth risk/benefit analysis before carrying out any such measure if
implementing such controls is unavoidable. See WORLD HEALTH ORG., Ebola and
Marburg, supra note 68.
146. S.A. Miller, A Top Health Expert Warns Against Closing Borders to Stop
Ebola, WASH. TIMES, Oct. 6, 2014, http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/oct/6/
a-top-health-expert-warns-against-closing-borders-/; Nossiter, supra note 40.
147. See Giugale, supra note 39.
148. Tom Odula & Lynsey Chutel, Africa Stems Ebola Via Border Closings, Luck,
ASSOCIATED PRESS (Oct. 17, 2014, 7:15 AM), http://news.yahoo.com/africa-stems-
ebola-via-border-closings-luck-182548855.html; Charlotte Alter, Liberia Closes Bor-
ders to Curb Ebola Outbreak, TIME (July 28, 2014), http://time.com/3046012/liberia-
border-ebola/.
149. See, e.g., Timothy C. Germann et al., Mitigation Strategies for Pandemic Influ-
enza in the United States, 103 PROC. NAT’L ACAD. SCI. U.S. 5935, 5936 (2006); T.
De´irdre Hollingsworth et al., Will Travel Restrictions Control the International Spread
of Pandemic Influenza?, 12 NATURE MED. 497, 498 (2006).
150. Neil M. Ferguson et al., Strategies for Mitigating an Influenza Pandemic, 442
NATURE 448, 448–49 (2006).
151. Id. at 449.
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due to the 9/11 terrorist attacks.152  Researchers discovered that the
peak date of 2001–2002 flu season in the United States was delayed by
approximately one month, a delay not seen in France where flight re-
strictions were not imposed.153  Even if border closures and flight re-
strictions delay the spread of disease, they do not eliminate the risk
entirely.
Varied border control policies in Nigeria and Senegal are illustra-
tive.  Both countries had limited numbers of Ebola cases initially, but
within weeks were declared “Ebola free” by WHO.154  Senegal ini-
tially closed its borders with Guinea in March 2014, but re-opened
land borders in May,155 only to close them again on August 21.156  Re-
ports conflict as to whether a Guinean university student, who became
Senegal’s first and only confirmed case of EVD, entered the country
before or after the August 21 border closure.157  Due to the discrep-
ancy in the timeline of the Guinean university student’s crossing into
Senegal, Senegal’s EVD case is interpreted by some as an example of
the ineffectiveness of border closures, while others suggest border clo-
sures kept further disease out of the country.158  Conversely, Nigeria
never closed its national borders while eradicating the disease.  De-
spite their varying approaches to border closures, both countries
moved quickly to trace contacts of the initial cases.159  Rigorous con-
tact tracing and follow-up with potential cases are credited by WHO
152. John S. Brownstein et al., Empirical Evidence for the Effect of Airline Travel
on Inter-Regional Influenza Spread in the United States, 3 PLOS MED. 1826, 1826
(2006).
153. Id. at 1829–30, 1832.
154. WHO Declares End of Ebola Outbreak in Nigeria, WORLD HEALTH ORG.
(Oct. 20, 2014), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/nigeria-ends-
ebola/en/; WHO Congratulates Senegal on Ending Ebola Transmission, WORLD
HEALTH ORG. (Oct. 17, 2014), http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/statements/2014/
senegal-ends-ebola/en.
155. Ebola Crisis: Senegal Defends Guinea Border Closure, BBC NEWS AFR. (Aug.
22, 2014, 5:36 PM), http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa-28893835.
156. Ray Sanchez, Senegal Confirms First Ebola Case, CNN (Aug. 29, 2014, 5:38
PM), http://www.cnn.com/2014/08/29/health/ebola-outbreak-senegal/.
157. Babacar Dione, Ebola Arrives in Senegal as Outbreak Accelerates, WASH.
TIMES (Aug. 29, 2014), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2014/aug/29/who-more-
ebola-cases-in-past-week-than-any-other/?page=all.
158. Ebola Spreads to Senegal After Student Evades Health Monitors, CBC NEWS
(Aug. 29, 2014, 10:48 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ebola-spreads-to-senegal-af-
ter-student-evades-health-monitors-1.2750314; Student Slips Over Border, Spreads
Ebola to Senegal, NBC NEWS (Aug. 29, 2014, 1:28 PM), http://www.nbcnews.com/
storyline/ebola-virus-outbreak/student-slips-over-border-spreads-ebola-senegal-
n192216; Vigilante ‘Border Guards’ Keeping Ebola out of Senegal, BUS. DAY LIVE
(Sept. 7, 2014, 7:51 PM), http://www.bdlive.co.za/africa/africannews/2014/09/06/vigi-
lante-border-guards-keeping-ebola-out-of-senegal.
159. Kelsey Mirkovic et al., Importation and Containment of Ebola Virus Disease—
Senegal, August–September 2014, 63 MORBIDITY & MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 873,
U.S. CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION (Oct. 3, 2014), http://www.cdc.gov/
mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/mm6339a6.htm?s_cid=mm6339a6_w; Nigeria Free of
Ebola, supra note 53.
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as crucial steps to preventing further disease spread within these two
countries.160
C. Case Study 3 – Lockdown
On September 6, 2014, Sierra Leone announced a three-day
lockdown of all residents in place from September 19–22.161  The ob-
jective was clear.  As people remained in residences and out of public
spaces, government officials would canvass the country, assess the im-
pacts of Ebola, identify new cases, and remove the bodies of victims.
The lockdown ended with Sierra Leone’s government declaring suc-
cess162 in locating new patients and removing bodies for safe burial.163
However, operational pitfalls and risks plagued its execution and led
to collateral damages.  Doctors Without Borders concluded:
“[L]ockdowns . . . do not help control Ebola as they end up driving
people underground and jeopardising [sic] the trust between people
and health providers.”164
Sierra Leone’s lockdown appears to be unique as a public health
measure.  In reality it assimilated several traditional practices.  Its
breadth is similar to large-scale quarantine actions (also known as cor-
don sanitaire) used typically to cordon off persons who may have been
exposed to infectious diseases for the duration of its incubation.  Dur-
ing the SARS outbreak, Toronto quarantined 13,000 people who may
have been exposed to the disease.165  The necessity of widespread
quarantine of roughly 100 people for each actual SARS case identified
have been criticized.166  Quarantine has been shown to effectively re-
duce the spread of smallpox in an attack scenario.167  Unlike tradi-
160. See Nigeria and Senegal: Stable—for the Moment, WORLD HEALTH ORG.,
http://www.who.int/csr/disease/ebola/ebola-6-months/nigeria-senegal/en (last visited
Nov. 18, 2014); Dennis Lynch, How to Stop an Ebola Outbreak: Lessons from Nigeria
and Senegal, INT’L BUS. TIMES (Oct. 16, 2014, 2:40 PM), http://www.ibtimes.com/how-
stop-ebola-outbreak-lessons-nigeria-senegal-1706297.
161. Bill Chapell, Ebola Spurs a Full Public Lockdown in Sierra Leone, WRVO
PUB. MEDIA (Sept. 6, 2014, 12:45 PM), http://wrvo.org/post/ebola-spurs-full-public-
lockdown-sierra-leone.
162. Umaru Fofana, Sierra Leone Wraps up Three-Day Ebola Lockdown, REUTERS
(Sept. 21, 2014, 10:57 PM), http://uk.reuters.com/article/2014/09/21/us-health-ebola-
leone-idUKKBN0HG0NW20140921.
163. Naina Bajekal, Ebola Lockdown in Sierra Leone Finds 150 New Cases, TIME
(Sept. 22, 2014), http://time.com/3417907/ebola-sierra-leone-lockdown/.
164. Me´decins Sans Frontie`res, MSF Reaction to ‘4-Day Lockdown’ Plan, RE-
LIEFWEB (Sept. 6, 2014), http://reliefweb.int/report/sierra-leone/msf-reaction-sierra-
leone-4-day-lockdown-plan.
165. Richard Schabas, Commentary, Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome: Did
Quarantine Help?, 15 CANADIAN J. INFECTIOUS DISEASES & MED. MICROBIOLOGY
204 (2004).
166. Id.
167. Martin Cetron et al., Isolation and Quarantine: Containment Strategies for
SARS 2003, in LEARNING FROM SARS: PREPARING FOR THE NEXT DISEASE OUT-
BREAK: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 71, 74–75 (Stacey Knobler et al. eds., The National
Academies Press 2004).
376 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2
tional quarantine practices, however, the very limited duration of
Sierra Leone’s three-day lockdown inherently limited its capacity to
stymie the spread of EVD, which has a twenty-one-day incubation
period.
In some ways, the lockdown replicated shelter-in-place orders used
often during biological, chemical, and radiological incidents, and in-
creasingly during security threats.  Residents are asked to stay in their
current locations until an all-clear order is issued, which may take
hours or days.  Shelter-in-place has been shown to be highly effective
in reducing morbidity and mortality during chemical spills168 and ac-
tive shooter events.169  Models show that its practice is also effective
during a biological attack by preventing exposure to airborne biologi-
cal agents.170  To the extent, however, that EVD already infiltrated
populations in Sierra Leone, there is little chance that significant addi-
tional exposures via lockdown were thwarted.  As well, only a small
percentage of infected individuals could likely be identified during
three days of lockdown.171
Shelter-in-place orders may severely restrict individual movement
and prevent supplies reaching large institutions and residents within
the cordon.172  Doctors Without Borders raised parallel concerns as
the Sierra Leone lockdown went into effect, noting that many poor
residents purchase food daily173 and get water from communal wells
that would be inaccessible.174  Reports of public disdain arose when
government workers did not have food to offer,175 nor any appropri-
ate places to receive health services given by HCWs.176
House-to-house case identification and public education activities
executed during Sierra Leone’s lockdown resemble more traditional
public health measures.  For example, contact tracing has been used
168. Sheltering in Place as a Public Protective Action, NAT’L INST. FOR CHEMICAL
STUDIES 1, 46 (2001), http://www.nicsinfo.org/docs/shelter%20in%20place.pdf.
169. James G. Hodge, Jr. & Kellie Nelson, Active Shooters in Health Care Settings:
Prevention and Response Through Law and Policy, 42 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 268, 269
(2014).
170. Lester L. Yuan, Sheltering Effects of Buildings from Biological Weapons, 8 SCI.
& GLOBAL SECURITY 287, 310 (2000).
171. Whether officials achieved their goal of visiting every residence across the
country is doubtful as pleas to extend the lockdown emerged to complete visits in
urban areas. Sierra Leone Looks to Extend Ebola Lockdown as it Aims to Stop
Spread, GUARDIAN (Sept. 21, 2014, 2:30 PM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2014/sep/21/sierra-leone-freetown-lockdown-ebola-continues.
172. NAT’L INST. FOR CHEMICAL STUDIES, supra note 168, at 45.
173. Me´decins Sans Frontie`res, supra note 164.
174. Poor Will Not Have Food or Water During Lockdown, Say Sierra Leoneans,
PLAN (Sept. 19, 2014), http://plan-international.org/about-plan/resources/media-
centre/press-releases/poor-will-not-have-food-or-water-during-lockdown-say-sierra-
leoneans/.
175. GUARDIAN, supra note 171.
176. Lisa O’Carroll, Sierra Leone’s Planned Ebola Lockdown Could ‘Spread Dis-
ease Further, GUARDIAN (Sept. 6, 2014, 4:40 AM), http://www.theguardian.com/world/
2014/sep/06/sierra-leone-lockdown-ebola-outbreak.
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effectively in outbreaks to control the spread of infections in many
scenarios.177  Effective public communication has been credited with
maintaining calm in Toronto during SARS and increasing voluntary
quarantine compliance.178  Strong public education campaigns are
generally seen as keystone efforts in any infectious disease control
program, whether preventive or responsive to an outbreak.179  Mass
notifications through phone or email are frequently used in many di-
sasters, and pilot projects have examined the utility of house-to-house
visits for vulnerable populations.180  Subject to future findings, the ed-
ucation and sanitation components of the lockdown may have helped
to improve the public’s understanding of the spread of EVD and the
need to seek health services.
During the Sierra Leone lockdown, 123 potential cases of EVD
were identified.181  In addition, ninety-two bodies were removed for
safe burial,182 reducing the potential for spread through unsafe funeral
practices.  There is little evidence, however, to suggest that these cases
would not have been identified through other means in the same time
period without a lockdown.  Coupled with substantial hardships posed
by lack of food, access to water, lost wages, and reduced economic
activity, the utility of national or city-wide lockdowns during public
health emergencies is seriously questioned.  As a method of taking a
public health inventory, the successes of Sierra Leone’s national
lockdown may be challenged when weighed against a bevy of deleteri-
ous impacts on the population, the great majority of which were not
exposed to or infected with Ebola.
D. Essence of Efficacy of Emergency Public Health Powers
These brief case studies on isolation, border closure, and lockdown
illustrate the complexities of assessing the efficacy of varied public
health measures to control Ebola.  When medical practitioners speak
of efficacy of medical treatments, they refer to “the net health benefits
177. Don Klinkenberg et al., The Effectiveness of Contact Tracing in Emerging
Epidemics, PLOS ONE (Dec. 20, 2006), http://www.plosone.org/article/
info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.0000012; Fraser et al., supra note 117, at
6151.
178. Gene Matthews, Public Health Law Preparedness, in LEARNING FROM SARS:
PREPARING FOR THE NEXT DISEASE OUTBREAK: WORKSHOP SUMMARY 230 (2004).
179. See Addressing Communication Challenges During an Infectious Disease
Emergency Response: State Experiences from the H1N1 Pandemic, ASS’N OF STATE &
TERRITORIAL HEALTH OFFICIALS, http://www.astho.org/Programs/Infectious-Dis-
ease/Addressing-Communication-Challenges-During-an-Infectious-Disease-Emergen
cy-Response/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2014).
180. Sheri Fink, U.S. Mines Personal Health Data to Find the Vulnerable in Emer-
gencies, N.Y. TIMES, May 16, 2014, at A18, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2014/
05/16/us/us-mines-personal-health-data-to-aid-emergency-response.html?_r=2.
181. Bajekal, supra note 163.
182. Ebola outbreak: Sierra Leone lockdown not extended, CBC NEWS (Sept. 21,
2014, 2:37 PM), http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/ebola-outbreak-sierra-leone-lockdown-
not-extended-1.2773408.
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achievable under ideal conditions for carefully selected patients. . . .
An efficacious treatment is one that does more good than harm to
those who receive it.”183  Public health researchers refer to efficacy in
terms of interventions for which “studies show the strongest associa-
tion between the intervention and the [desired] outcome.”184  “Effi-
cacy,” concludes one source, “is the ability to produce a desired
amount of a desired effect.”185
To the degree that efficacy is tied solely to detection and prevention
of the spread of Ebola, the practice of isolation offers a reasonable
example of success.  However, assessing efficacy of public health legal
interventions tied solely to Ebola-related improvements is misguided.
By this standard, isolation that prevents the spread of Ebola but kills
the patient for unrelated reasons would be considered efficacious.
Public health measures that mitigate one threat to communal health
but raise multiple others are not efficacious from a public policy
perspective.
The essence of efficacy for purposes of public health legal interven-
tions is broader in scope.  It requires balancing the underlying legal
authority for the intervention, possible impairments of human rights,
and potential negative collateral health impacts (akin to what econo-
mists might refer to as “opportunity costs”).186  Under this conception
of efficacy, each of the public health interventions noted above
presents a mixed bag of outcomes.
Touting the merits of isolation as a disease control measure cannot
be divorced from the negative impacts on patients and their families
coupled with the spotty record of actual compliance and infection
avoidance among HCWs and others.  Gauging the effectiveness of
Ebola-related border closures seems speculative when similarly-situ-
ated countries apply the intervention unevenly or without adequate
enforcement.  Declaring victory following the administration of a na-
tional lockdown in Sierra Leone seems fallacious when balanced
against significant, albeit temporary, infringements on the rights to
health, travel, and access to food and water.187  If none of these public
health legal measures meets our threshold of efficacy to control
Ebola, maybe our balance needs to be recalibrated or our conception
is merely flawed.
183. WILHELM KIRCH, THE ENCYLCOPEDIA OF PUBLIC HEALTH 321 (2008).
184. Rosanne P. Farris et al., Beyond Effectiveness: Evaluating the Public Health
Impact of the WISEWOMAN Program, 97 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH 641, 642 (2007).
185. KIRCH, supra note 183.
186. Opportunity cost is defined as “the most highly valued opportunity or alterna-
tive forfeited when a choice is made.” ROGER A. ARNOLD, ECONOMICS 5 (12th ed.
2015).
187. David Lewis, Sierra Leone Lockdown Will Not Help Halt Ebola, REUTERS
(Sept. 6, 2014, 12:23 PM), http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/09/06/us-health-ebola-
idUSKBN0H10ID20140906.
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Yet, assessing the efficacy of these and other purported public
health interventions consistent with our conception is critical.188  Pub-
lic health officials may be authorized to use a litany of measures via
emergency powers in principle, but if these choices lack effectiveness
their use may be called into doubt for four essential reasons:
1. to the extent they infringe on human rights without justification
they violate universal norms;
2. if these measures do not directly alleviate the impacts of Ebola
while damaging populations in other ways, they cause more harm than
good in contravention of ethical, legal, and human rights duties to pro-
tect the public’s health;
3. absent sufficient assessment of their potential efficacy, these
measures cannot be used reliably as tools to control infectious dis-
eases; and
4. lacking reliability, their use may actually detract from other
public health efforts to control Ebola.
So which emergency public health measures should be implemented
when efficacy is unknown or uncertain and all other potential inter-
ventions are unavailable (e.g., vaccines, HCWs), impractical (e.g., re-
moval of all West African patients to high-level treatment centers), or
dysfunctional (e.g., active surveillance systems)?  Why not let govern-
ments in Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Nigeria experiment with
a gamut of public health measures when no other good options exist?
A similar question in a different context might ask whether to allow
the use of experimental drugs for Ebola when half of infected patients
are going to die anyway. What’s the harm?
Minimal applications of experimental drugs can injure or kill pa-
tients.  This is a regrettable consequence, but perhaps a risk that pa-
tients and practitioners are willing to take.  Conversely, unproven use
of alleged lawful public health interventions to control infectious dis-
ease outbreaks can destroy public trust and harm entire populations in
contravention of legitimate public health practices grounded in sci-
ence, not fiction.  Balancing health and human rights requires solid
data of an intervention’s efficacy (or lack thereof).  Such practices
cannot reflect a respect for human rights when there is no clear,
strong, and repeatable assessment of their capacity to improve the
public’s health.  When the collective harms of disease control inter-
ventions infringe on human rights without public health justification,
they not only lack efficacy, but also are unlawful as applied.
188. For an example of an efficacious public health intervention, see Fidel Villegas,
et al., Administration of Triclabendazole Is Safe and Effective in Controlling Fasci-
oliasis in an Endemic Community of the Bolivian Altiplano, 6 PLOS NEGLECTED
TROPICAL DISEASES 1 (2012) (triclabendazole is efficacious in treating endemic fasci-
oliasis by reducing the intensity and prevalence of the illness).
380 TEXAS A&M LAW REVIEW [Vol. 2
VI. CONCLUSION
The spread of Ebola can be stopped, but how and at what price?
Unwarranted uses of social distancing measures in affected West Afri-
can countries may fail to control infectious diseases and negatively
impact communal health by denying people access to food, medicines,
treatments, and other life-sustaining services.  There is a real potential
that more persons may die from EVD in these regions due directly to
deleterious public health practices applied across populations.  More
so, even greater numbers of persons may perish from causes other
than EVD because public health interventions designed to halt the
epidemic lack efficacy.  To avoid these outcomes, public health powers
must be tied to known outcomes across an array of communal health
impacts.  Humane, efficacious use of emergency public health powers
coupled with major infusions of global resources and personnel may
prevent excess morbidity and mortality from Ebola now, and for de-
cades to come.
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APPENDIX 1. EBOLA-RELATED EMERGENCY MEASURES IN SELECT
COUNTRIES
(NUMERICAL DATA AS OF 2/17/15)
Declaration  
Information Guinea Liberia Nigeria Sierra Leone 
Date 8/13/14 8/6/14 8/8/14 7/30/14 








State of Public 
Emergency6
























Task Force on 
Ebola
Affected #s7 11,474,383 4,092,310 177,155,754 5,743,725 
Potential Cases/ 
Deaths8 + % 
3,044/1,995 
66% death rate 
8,881/3,826 
43% death rate 
20/8
40% death rate 
10,934/3,341 









Cordon Sanitaire ז14 ז15 ז16
Curfews ז17 ז18




Isolation ז24 ז25 ז26 ז27
Lockdown    ז28
Price Controls  ז29
Quarantine ז30 ז31 ז ז32
Screening ז33 ז34 ז ז
Surveillance ז ז ז ז
Testing ז ז ז35 ז
Travel
Restrictions ז ז ז ז
Treatment ז ז ז36 ז37
Totals 11 14 8 14 
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